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On global epidemics and society: a journey beyond the 
next crisis 
 
Rector Magnificus, ladies and gentlemen, 
 
 
Before the installation of the 45th president of the US in Jan 2017, the president-elect’s 
executive staff members were briefed on four potential crises: an environmental disaster, a 
terrorist attack, a cyber-attack and an outbreak of an infectious disease. [1] Was this a purely 
precautionary step, relating to remote possibilities? Or was it a considered exercise in quick 
risk ranking in order to focus political attention? How do we explain the prominent place of 
infectious diseases on society’s agenda, four decades after they were declared a rather dull 
path that one might pursue as a medical career. [2, 3] In 1978, one of the most respected 
experts on infectious diseases, Dr. Robert Petersdorf, predicted in the NEJM that “future 
medical specialists might end up culturing each other”, rather than having anything 
meaningful to work on [3]. This might send some shivers down the spines of the 
microbiologists in the room. Today, the reality is very different from those predictions, with 
outbreaks of emerging and re-emerging pathogens spreading internationally and making the 
news headlines. Outbreaks of infectious diseases have also surpassed the status of terra 
incognita for laypeople and have become a matter of concern for us all, and a  subject of 
interest for opinion leaders. In Bill Gates’ words: “the world needs a global warning and 







In my lecture today, I will be discussing outbreaks of communicable disease from the 
perspective of society, and looking at how a trans-disciplinary approach can improve our 
preparedness and response.  
 
But first, allow me start with an experiment 
As we sit here today (actually, with me standing at a safe distance from you, in terms of 
disease transmission), it is possible that some of you are infected with microorganisms that 
could cause infections, or that you are carrying them unknowingly, and that you could 
transfer those microorganisms to the people sitting around you. It is very likely that this 
transfer - should it occur – will be fairly harmless. However, imagine that there was 
somebody here today who was infected with a virus that causes a highly pathogenic and 
contagious disease, just at the end of its incubation period, and able to infect others. Imagine 
that we did not know who this person was. That person could be you. Or it could be the 
person next to you. Or the lady two rows in front of you. And by the way, you can’t leave the 
room before the end of my talk. Given that the room is full of public health and infectious 
disease control experts, we would immediately issue sound scientific advice regarding this 
rather worrying situation. We would appeal to people not to panic. We would ask everybody 
to leave their name and address in case they need to be reached at a later stage. We would 
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tell everyone to monitor their health for a certain period of time, and to report to their 
general practitioner if they develop a fever. But despite of all this, imagine that the 
authorities decided to place all of us in quarantine until further notice, in this very room. You 
cannot go home tonight, nor will you see your loved ones again until further notice. Take five 
seconds to imagine what would be going through your mind… 
The experiment is over for now. The world is a safe place again, for you. 
 
Throughout the history of mankind, the world has never been safe from infectious diseases, 
with outbreaks being credited with military victories, the destruction of civilizations, 
disruption to communities, economic crises, the exclusion of infected individuals from social 
interaction. And, because of all this, they have inspired art and literature. I would like to give 
you some examples of these effects.  
 
 
Part one: the Plague 
Let me take you back in time, to Athens, between 430-426 BC during an outbreak referred to 
as the Plague of Athens. Whether this was in fact plague or rather an outbreak of Salmonella 
typhi, as recent research at a mass burial site in Athens has indicated,  is not essential to my 
story. [5] Why this outbreak remains lodged in our collective memory is the catastrophic 
impact that it had upon a city at war. So widespread was the outbreak and so deadly was its 
impact, that Athens lost one quarter of its population, lost its leader and ultimately, lost the 
Peloponnesian War to Sparta. The main significance of the plague of Athens can be found in 
an accurate description given by Thucydides. He reports a global disease “coming from 
Ethiopia and passing through Egypt and Libya into the Greek world — a plague so severe and 
deadly that no one anywhere could recall its like”. [6] Furthermore, he refers to moral decay, 
social unrest and societal fracture, all fuelled by people’s genuine fear of becoming ill. Here, 
we see the societal impact of an outbreak of disease in an overcrowded city under siege, 
heralding the collapse of the most culturally advanced state in the world at that time. 
Historians point to the lack of a powerful leader, a crisis manager in our words, able to 
mobilise the city to a coherent response. Would the survival of Pericles, the legendary war 




The second example brings us into the Middle Ages. Although plague outbreaks also 
occurred between the 6th and the 8th century, the plague outbreak referred to as the Great 







This was probably the most devastating global epidemic, engulfing three continents (Europe, 
Asia and the North of Africa) and decimating two-thirds of Europe’s population.  Arriving 
from China, plague entered Europe through maritime trade routes, reaching the harbours of 
Sicily and Marseille first. [8] By mid-1348, the epidemic had arrived in Florence, Rome and 
Paris, and from there, it spread to the rest of Europe.  
 
As we now know, plague is caused by a bacterium, Yersinia pestis, transmitted by rats to 
humans through rodent fleas, or directly, from person-to-person. It has three main clinical 
manifestations referred to as: bubonic plague, septiceamic plague and pneumonic plague. 
Again, we owe one of the most accurate descriptions of what plague looked like in the 14th 
century to a famous eyewitness, the writer Giovanni Boccaccio, who, in his Decameron, 
described ten days in the life of ten people who fled Florence to escape the disease. They 
lock themselves up in a villa outside the city and spend their time telling stories, the 
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Medieval equivalent of today’s storytelling, now increasingly used in education and 
communication about infectious diseases.  
 
He tells of people suffering from “swellings, either in the groin or under the armpits”, 
growing as big as  “a common apple, others to the size of an egg, which the vulgar named 
plague-boils”. [9] The story crafted around this terrifying disease reports that people would 
go to bed well and be found lying dead in the morning. Nobody understood the real cause of 
this terrible disease, and people initially fell back on explanations and practices that often 
only increased societal disruption and facilitated the spread of the disease. People were 
unwilling to care for the sick, “brother abandoned brother” [9], and many tried to escape 
from the big cities, thus carrying the infection to previously uninfected remote areas, very 
much in line with the ancient Hippocratic advice regarding plague, to act:  ‘cito, longe, tarde’ 
(fly quickly, go far, return slowly). [10] Those left without support died in their homes or in 
street corners, their bodies being piled up for mass burials. Initially, caught between the fear 
of infection and the lack of any organized response, any action taken was confined to the 
level of individuals or small communities, with a prominent role for clergy and a lesser role 
for doctors. However, the array of measures used – flagellation, boil-lancing, bleeding, and 
the use of vinegar and perfumed herbs – did not prove effective [11]. And nor did blaming 
the contagion on the Jews.   
    
Although they were ignorant of how exactly diseases are spread from person to person, 
people did understand, however, that staying away from those infected could be helpful, 
thus laying the basis for two outbreak control measures that we still use in the modern 
times: isolating the sick and social distancing in the healthy. Soon, rudimentary forms of 
locally organised response emerged in the form of isolation in dedicated plague houses 
(known in Italy as the lazaretto) outside city limits, or the transportation of patients out into 
the fields, where they were left either to die or to recover. [12,13] Some cities denied access 
to incoming visitors whom they regarded as strangers, including merchants, Jews, leprosy 
patients, and enforced compliance with armed force. [13]   
 
A breakthrough in outbreak control was achieved  on July 27, 1377, when the Great Council 
of the city of Dubrovnik introduced quarantining. From now on, all healthy people arriving 
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from regions thought to be at risk of plague would be quarantined – a mandatory period of 
forty days to be spent outside the city, in designated facilities, in order for the local 
authorities to make sure that they were not displaying any symptoms of plague. In the 
decades that followed, the harbours of Marseilles, Venice, Pisa, and Genoa implemented 






The painting of the city of Dubrovnik [14] has become iconic, showing a well-organized city, 
with ships waiting patiently to be allowed in and red-roofed houses showing the location of 
the quarantine quarters. Upon entering the harbour, vessels, crew and cargo underwent 
inspection, followed by fumigation and the treatment of goods. [13] In the centuries that 
followed, quarantine and ship sanitation would become cornerstones in the efforts to 
control disease transmission through port cities. There were, however, violations of the 
quarantine regulations, which were punished according to local customs. In Leiden, violators 
would either need to ‘provide 2,000 bricks for the city wall or have a hand cut off’ . (15). 
 
City authorities started becoming aware of their role and issued “ordinances”. The oldest 
ones date back to the mid-15th century and cover a wide range of issues, including how to 
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deal with houses where patients had died, how to handle their waste, food and clothes, how 
to care for the sick, and also rules concerning participation in processions and even fines to 
be administered for cursing or swearing. [16] 
 
Like plague houses and quarantine measures, the first use of personal protection equipment 
also seems to be connected with the Black Death. Plague continued to re-emerge in Europe, 
and by the 16th century, Charles de Lorme, a French physician, introduced a variant of what 
we know today as the facial mask, together with the protective gown. [17] Elaborating on 
the miasmatic theory, this rudimentary form of personal protective equipment was designed 
to protect the body from contact with ‘bad air’, which was thought to cause the disease. 
Here we see a mask with a kind of bird’s beak, filled with herbs and spices. Although the 
instructions for use, the materials used, the rigor of donning and doffing procedures, and the 
shapes and comfort have all changed significantly, masks, gowns, goggles and hoods have 
remained extremely important components of infection prevention, right through to the 








In this first part, we have travelled back in time, through major plague epidemics. But we 
have yet to see a response at any level higher than the city level, or any attempt at more 
coordinated action between cities. Both the plague and some of the measures taken to 
control it, increased fear, triggered panic, led to social fracture within population groups, 
and contributed to an economic standstill in the affected regions.  
 
Plague returned time and again, although never as devastatingly as in the mid-14th century. 
Nowadays, plague is endemic in parts of Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Occasional outbreaks 
occur in a limited number of countries. Patients are given antibiotics, as well as those who 







Part two: coordinated international response 
Quarantine and the other measures to control plague continued to serve as models for 
responding to subsequent health threats, such as cholera and smallpox that had become 
problems by the 17th century in Asia, Europe and the New World, but responses remained 






It was not until 1851 that the first attempt to reach any international agreement on 
quarantine took place, at the First International Sanitary Conference in Paris. Quarantine 
measures taken by one country would profoundly impact the economy of other countries. It 
is therefore not surprising that at the 1893 Conference, agreements were made to protect 
the public against cholera epidemics, while not ‘unnecessarily obstructing commercial 
transactions and passenger traffic’ [18].  
 
With the discovery of microorganisms as the causative agents of infectious diseases in the 
second half of the 19th century, a major breakthrough would follow regarding antisepsis, 
diagnostics, treatment and prophylaxis of diseases. This falls outside the scope of this 
lecture. However, undeniably, the most spectacular impact in controlling infectious diseases 
was achieved through improved hygiene and sanitation. 
 
The beginning of the 20th century brought with it the Inter-American Sanitary Convention 
with notification requirements for cases of cholera, plague, and yellow fever. In 1924, the 
Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, L’Office International d’Hygiene Publique, the Health 
Organisation of the League of Nations, and the Office International des Epizooties were set 
up. Meanwhile, smallpox, typhus and relapsing fever were added to the list of quarantinable 
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diseases at points of entry: mainly harbours and later also airports. By the mid-20th century, 
international measures were being handled by twelve different convention agreements and 
numerous organisations [18].  
 
In 1951, the International Sanitary Regulations were put in place, under the  responsibility of 
the WHO, which had been established three years earlier. The ISR, a legally binding set of 
rules concerning global outbreak measures, were renamed the IHR (International Health 
Regulations) in 1969.[19]  Along the way, typhus, relapsing fever and smallpox were 
removed, and by 1981 the list of internationally notifiable disease included only plague, 
cholera and yellow fever. Interestingly, by the time the structure and legal obligations for the 
international governance of outbreaks were in place, the perception of infectious diseases as 
a threat to international public health had already started to decline, due to the 
development of new antibiotics, vaccines, and improved living conditions. Hence the 
explanation of the relatively complacent attitude to infectious diseases in the sixties and 
seventies, as I referred to at the beginning of my talk.  
 
With international regulations concentrating on only three diseases and being carefully 
crafted so as not to interfere too much with trade, together with the perception of infectious 
diseases as a fairly small risk, the world missed decades of opportunities to build a robust 
emergency response infrastructure for epidemics, connected to the healthcare system. The 
IHR were seen simply as a reporting tool for the authorities seaports, airports and ground 
crossings, as a part of a wider system of border defences. Illustrative in this respect is the 
absence of polio and influenza on the list of internationally notifiable diseases, although the 
WHO did ask countries to notify them when “they reached a prevalence” that might be 
“internationally important” [20]  
 
But meanwhile, new diseases were emerging such as Marburg, Ebola, Nipah virus infections 
and AIDS. Due to the many unknowns that it presented, AIDS is considered the wake-up call, 
reminding us that diseases continuously emerge and re-emerge and can spread at an 
unprecedented pace, if allowed to develop unnoticed. According to the UNAIDS 36.9 million 
people in the world were living with HIV in 2017 (the majority of them in Africa). Since the 




Between 1995-2005, the WHO undertook a thorough revision of the IHR while new global 
health threats continued to emerge, such as avian flu, bioterrorism and SARS, challenging 
traditional response and control systems. The revised International Health Regulations of 
2005 contain procedures for phasing and ranking international alerts and crises, with a 
public health event of international concern (PHEIC) being the highest level. Countries are 
required to provide core capacities to prevent, detect and control outbreaks, and to report 
on their status periodically. [22,23] 
 
Crises and threats have fascinated me ever since the start of my career as a communicable 
disease control physician. My involvement with research into crises dates back to the 
beginning of this century. Studying the responses to SARS, LGV, Marburg haemorrhagic 
fever, flu and Q fever, I found that experts judge evidence differently and that even where 
evidence is judged uniformly, this can lead to a wide range of response measures, depending 
on the national context. These differences can have serious cross-border implications. 
Furthermore, I have learned that both the crisis and the crisis response have consequences 
for society as a whole, extending beyond the patients and risk groups. And that, when crises 
subside, we tend to go back to our daily routines. And yet, it is not possible to achieve 
adequate preparedness for the next crisis, without learning from the previous ones. 
 
The question I would ask is whether we, as a public health community and as countries, in 
particular, are equipped to learn from previous crises and understand what is needed to 
come up with an integrated response, comprehensive and fair to everybody, factoring in all 
the cultural, behavioural and societal phenomena that are at play during crises. 
 
Part three: Ebola 
The answer to this question came at the time of the Ebola outbreak.  
In December 2013, a 2-year old child died of a severe disease, suffering from high fever and 
diarrhoea, after reportedly having had contact with bats in a village in Guinea, close to the 
borders with Sierra Leone and Liberia. Soon afterwards, several of his family members 
became sick too, followed by midwives, traditional healers and healthcare workers at the 




By mid-March 2014, further laboratory testing revealed the Ebola virus to be the cause of 
the disease. The child I was telling you about is believed to be the “patient 0” of the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa. [24] Between its discovery in 1976 and 2013, Ebola virus (EBOV) had 
caused 2,200 infections and 1,500 deaths in several outbreaks in Central Africa, but never 




On March 23, 2014 the WHO announced the West Africa outbreak, with 49 cases and 29 
deaths officially notified, ranking it as an internal grade 2 outbreak [26,27]. One week later, 
cases emerged in two neighbouring countries: Sierra Leone and Liberia, although these were 
only later recognised as such. Healthcare workers on the ground were facing difficulties 
ranging from lack of trust among the local population to weak infrastructure for infection 
prevention and control, insufficient treatment facilities and understaffing.   
 
In the months that followed, traditional methods of caring for the ill, burial rituals and high 
intensity cross-border movements accelerated the epidemic. Within a week, the number of 
cases in Liberia had more than doubled and calls for the WHO to take the lead were getting 
louder. The imminence of border control measures became clear by the end of July, when an 
airline passenger from Liberia was diagnosed with Ebola in Lagos, Nigeria. [27] This was one 
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of the key events in shifting international risk perceptions regarding Ebola. It moved from a 
regional outbreak in West Africa to a potential source of worldwide infections, with 
potentially catastrophic consequences and political dimensions.  
 
As Ebola reached the slums of Liberia’s capital, Monrovia, “the bodies of the dead were left 
out in the street for days, as the city grappled with the growing number of Ebola cases and 
the limited healthcare capabilities”. [28] Whole neighbourhoods were placed under 
quarantine, and effectively trapped without food, water, proper sanitation facilities and 
basic care [28].  Some escaped. Sick people and corpses disappeared. There are reports of 
people who bribed the burial teams to obtain a license for private burials, disregarding 
regulations. [29] The WHO Emergency Committee finally declared on August 8 that Ebola 
was a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), putting it on the highest 
international alert level. [30] Exit screening at borders was advised in the affected countries, 
but the committee argued strongly against travel and trade bans, which have not proven 
useful in the past, and were seen as knee-jerk measures by authorities wanting to 
demonstrate a decisive response and protect their own citizens against disease.   
 
As the weeks passed, models predicted an imminent disaster if the worst case scenario of 
1.4 million patients were to become a reality. [30] At the end of August, the WHO launched 
the Roadmap, setting out strategies and the goals to be achieved, followed by the 
establishment of the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), the first-ever 
mission of its kind addressing a communicable disease. Its aim was to “increase the scale and 
co-ordination of the [response to the] Ebola outbreak“ [30], and to ensure the flow of 
resources and staff needed. Taking a different perspective,  David Heymann et al. conclude 
that this mission “stripped the WHO from leadership” and “implemented an approach that is 
unsustainable for long-term global health security”. [32]   
 
It became clear that Ebola had gone far beyond a medical crisis. Healthcare systems, already 
weak before the crisis, were becoming completely dysfunctional. Access to maternal and 
childcare dropped dramatically, vaccination programmes stopped, and the incidence of 




‘A handful of imported cases followed by limited local transmission were diagnosed in the 
United States and Spain in the autumn of 2014, shifting public attention from the epicentre 
of the outbreak, to the “perceived risk” in Western countries.’ [36]  
 
Fuelled by non-stop media coverage, the communis opinio demanded that authorities take 
action. State-based quarantine protocols for healthcare workers and travellers from West-
Africa were issued in the US, which were often imposed on people who had had no known 
contact with Ebola patients (37). Altogether in the US, 10,344 persons were monitored for 
fever and other health complaints for a 21-day period, a measure that was meant to 
reassure the population (38).  
 
Let us return now to the experiment that I began with, when I announced that you would all 
be quarantined, a measure not supported by the evidence in this case. How did that feel? 
This actually happened during the Ebola crisis, with people being picked out of restaurants, 
and denied medical services and social contact. One  physician returning to the US after 
having worked in Sierra Leone, for instance, was even denied access to the apartment 
building she used to live and required to quarantine elsewhere. [28]   
 
It is easy to see how misperceptions influence behaviour. Despite the efforts to inform the 
public, essential knowledge on how the disease is transmitted and who was at risk did not 
reach its target audience effectively. [39,40,41] 
 
Travel to and from the African countries affected by Ebola decreased to a minimum as a 
result of increased public fear, but mainly because more than 40 countries imposed strict 
traffic restrictions , despite the WHO’s advice.[42] These restrictions meant that the affected 
countries found it even more difficult to receive the personnel and resources that they 
needed. Inevitably, as the outbreak progressed in the autumn of 2014 and into 2015, foreign 
emergency (healthcare) workers became infected and were evacuated to Europe and the US 
for further treatment. This fuelled concerns about equality of access to the best healthcare 
and life-saving experimental treatment regimens, which were made available to infected 
foreign volunteers, but not to infected people in Africa. [27] In the end, as a result of 
comprehensive surveillance, contact tracing, quarantine and isolation, safe burials and later 
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ring vaccination, the number of cases began to fall in 2015. Controlling the outbreak was 
possible only through the joint involvement of “anthropologists, community engagement 
experts, social mobilizers, doctors and nurses, sanitation workers, and safe and dignified 
burial teams”. [43] By June 2016, the Ebola outbreak in West-Africa had come to an end.  
Altogether 28,616 patients had been reported in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, with 
11,310 deaths. [44]  
 
Ebola helped redefine the global health security agenda and fuelled the debate on the role 
of the WHO as the leading international health agency, but also about the role of the 
international community. The WHO underwent a critical appraisal, with a panel of 
international experts, followed by an organisational reform.  [41] According to the WHO, the 
critical question now was how to ensure that populations and their health services are ready 
for the next EVD outbreak, wherever it may occur. [45] 
 
The next EVD occurred sooner than expected, and the newly established WHO Centre for 
Emergency Preparedness and Response is, as we speak, coordinating an Ebola outbreak in 
the province of Kivu, in the DRC. This outbreak is occurring in an even more challenging 
social context with opposition groups fighting each other. Ebola treatment centres have 
repeatedly been assaulted and patients with Ebola taken away from the hospitals. 
 
I have shown you some examples of the global game changers that have shaped our 
response to crises. They all had in common an initial lack of knowledge about the disease, its 
cause, how it is transmitted and the best measures to be taken. People in affected 
communities started avoiding the sick, avoiding care, fleeing and resorting to rituals and 
traditions that facilitated further spread. The initial responses of authorities, late and 
fragmented, were largely distrusted by the population. The international response, which 
was based on properly functioning public healthcare at the national level, could not be 
supported by healthcare infrastructure that was unable to cope with the crisis. A generic 
pattern would be that epidemics thrive in fragile communities, in circumstances that are 
conducive to a slow, fragmented response. A second observation is that the responses, in 
turn, have an impact that goes far beyond the public health infrastructure, affecting 





Part four: beyond the next crisis 
In the end, the classical toolbox of control concepts and measures, which emerged as a 
result of plague, remains pivotal in controlling modern outbreaks: quarantine, isolation, 
individual protection gear and education. Of course, antibiotics, vaccines, antivirals and 
advanced life support facilities have also been added to this toolbox in recent decades and 
have advanced the field of communicable diseases. But that toolbox needs to be handled by 
competent public health organisations  that rely on and are connected with the healthcare 
infrastructure.  However, if we want to look beyond the next crisis, this tool box must 
include tools that focus on engaging affected communities and all the relevant stakeholders 
in society, in formulating, implementing, communicating, and sustaining control 
interventions.  
 
In this chair, I intend to develop a research and education programme based on four themes 
that relate to outbreak response and societal engagement. 
 
The first theme includes the transdisciplinary, conceptual link between an outbreak (or the 
risk of progression) with preparedness and response strategies including communication 
activities. Together with a multidisciplinary research team, we will study response strategies 
in relation to the sequential development of crises (both past and real-time crises) to reveal 
patterns and mechanisms that influence the magnitude of their societal impact, in both 
national and international contexts. We are currently working on linking response measures, 
crisis communication and the behaviour of the public concerning the meningococcal W 
outbreak in the No Panic project. This theme builds on my own PhD research and 
consecutive studies undertaken with Radboud University Nijmegen on outbreak 
preparedness and response. It also involves a PhD project within the Joint Action Healthy 
Gateways, designed to improve the implementation of IHR during cross-border threats. This 
project is consistent with our research activities within the WHO Collaborative Centre for IHR 
implementation. A new application for international collaboration in the 2019 JA Sharp on 
strengthening multisectoral preparedness and response to crises together with the Erasmus 




These projects will also relate to the second theme: from science to crisis measures.  
Translating scientific knowledge into knowledge that is relevant to policy decisions regarding 
infectious disease crises, when there is time pressure and a high degree of uncertainty, is 
challenging. We saw countries undertake divergent measures  during SARS, the 2009 
pandemic, Ebola and more recently, when Zika emerged. This theme will include 
comparative studies in the EU countries, but also elsewhere, regarding the provision of 
scientific advice to inform policy decisions, with the ultimate goal of responding to crises 
better and addressing cross-border implications effectively. 
 
Some have wondered whether it is worth treating outbreaks like other “warlike threats“ [28] 
using a military-style governance structure. In this chair I will be working in theme three, on 
the hypothesis that it is worth mounting an adequate response by understanding and 
making use of the formal and pop-up networks that emerge during crises. When the HPV 
vaccine was introduced, uptake among adolescent girls was much lower than expected. 
Vocal “pop-up” groups of laypeople but also scientists exerted an influence on parental 
attitudes to the vaccination. [46]  It is important to understand how these networks emerge, 
which latent knowledge they might harbour and what their drivers are. 
 
In a series of studies conducted with colleagues from other universities, we are looking into 
the subject of peer influences and how decisions about measures spread through networks. 
With colleagues from Tilburg University we look at network characteristics, performance 
criteria and the optimal governance models for outbreaks. In this regard, we have studied 
cross-border and cross-institutional outbreaks of multi-drug resistant micro-organisms and 
zoonotic diseases, visualising the networks that emerge in crises, from the perspectives of 
integration, strength of collaboration and coordination. We see complex networks, highly 
centralized depending on a small number of prominent stakeholders. Are these models 
sustainable in the future? In the coming years, we will continue to study composition of 





The fourth theme focuses particularly on the engagement of patients, risk groups and the 
public, in the broadest sense of the word, who are affected by response measures during 
crises and threats. What are their needs with respect to understanding risks and adopting 
measures? What are the side effects of those measures, as perceived from their 
perspective? What are the opportunities for public engagement in generating data on the 
progression of an outbreak? I have started two PhD projects, one on patient and public 
participation in crises and the other on designing an international roadmap to increase 
vaccine uptake in the elderly, the latter within the IMI VITAL consortium. In an ongoing, joint 
study on modelling perceptions of risk, human behaviour and the impact of national 
vaccination programmes (MORPHINE), led by the modelling department of the RIVM, we 
hope to arrive at a better understanding of parental perceptions and how individual 
decisions on vaccination are made. Finally, we are studying the experiences of carriers of 
MDRO and looking at ways of relieving the burden of control measures imposed on them, a 
very creative project in collaboration with Radboud University Medical Centre and 
Wageningen University, also involving a PhD student. 
 
My teaching activities will be at the crossroads between medical science and 
transdisciplinary methods in public health. I hope to lay the basis for this approach in the 
Bachelor’s programmes and develop this further in the Master’s programmes. I believe that 
understanding how we respond to crises - from a perspective that is broader than a bio-
medical perspective alone - will be important for the future generations, beyond the next 
crisis. I intend to consolidate these interdisciplinary themes in research and education, with 
the aim of adding value to future practice and policy around crisis control. I will investigate 
opportunities for reaching out to the Medical Faculty in developing capita selecta for the 
future physicians who understand that the threat from infectious diseases is not simply a 
bogeyman from the past, and is likely to be a major challenge in the future. In the words of 
Albert Camus: “la peste réveillera ses rats et les enverra mourir dans une cité heureuse”… 
 
 
Meneer de rector, dames en heren, 
Ik ben me zeer bewust van de discussie die zich op dit moment afspeelt over het gebruik van 
de Nederlandse taal op universiteiten. En toch heb ik gekozen om deze rede in het Engels uit 
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te spreken. De rede heb ik onderbouwd met voorbeelden van uitbraken wereldwijd en 
teksten, beelden en muziek van mannen en vrouwen die de kunst van het vertellen als geen 
ander verstaan, uit verschillende taalgebieden. Hiermee wil ik benadrukken dat 
infectieziektebestrijding bij uitstek het vak is dat geen taalgrenzen kent, maar een eigen 




Having almost arrived at the end of this lecture, I would like to mention my own personal 
international trajectory, which has brought me from Romania to the Netherlands, and 
involved two  universities which have awarded me with a medical degree: the University of 
Medicine and Pharmacy of Cluj-Napoca (Klausenburg) and the VU University Amsterdam. 
Following some years of work as a community health physician at the Public Health Service 
in Delft, I joined the LCI (National Coordination Centre for Communicable Disease Control), 
which since 2005 has been located at the RIVM, within the CIb, under the leadership of 
Professor Coutinho. There, I was given the opportunity to study crises and complete my PhD 
at Radboud University Nijmegen. 
 
I would like to thank the Executive Board of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and the College of 
Deans for my appointment. I also thank the RIVM for making this chair possible, and 
especially Professor van Dissel, director of the CIb and Chair of the Committee of Curators, 
Professor Andre van der Zande and Professor Hans Brug, past and present Director General 
of the RIVM. I am also grateful to Professor Schreiber, Dean of the Faculty of Sciences and to 
Professors Broerse and Bunders for offering me this position at the Athena Institute. 
  
As a PhD student, I had the most stimulating team of supervisors and co-supervisors that 
anyone could hope for, some became friends. They are all here! Thank you to Professor Grol, 
Professor van der Meer, Professor Hulscher, Dr van Steenbergen. Richard, Jos, Marlies and 
Jim – what a treat it was to work together. Jim, you helped me with my very first outbreak in 
a psychogeriatric ward, and many others that followed. You built the foundation of LCI and 




Colleagues of LCI, with you at my side, there are no crises or threats that we cannot cope 
with. Your energy and passion for communicable diseases is infectious. Corien, Hans & Hans, 
Marloes, Rogier your support in leading LCI is essential. Karin, Saskia, Sabine and Rosa, 
thanks for helping me get everything ready for today!  Colleagues at the Centre for 
Infectious Diseases and RIVM, working with you is a privilege. Colleagues at the Spider Lab at 
LCI: researchers, post docs, residents, PhD students, interns, you rock when you talk science!  
Over the past months, I have got to meet and work with new colleagues from the Athena 
Institute, a close-knit group with a solid reputation in research and education. My door is 
always open to you! Thank you Professor van den Bosch (Han) for building the foundations 
on which I can base my activities! To all the colleagues from other organizations and 
universities who are here today, and who have crossed my path in the past and, hopefully 
will do so many times in the future: your presence today means a lot to me.  
Dear friends from abroad, friends from the Netherlands, friends of a lifetime or friends made 
more recently, I am very grateful for having you all in my life and I look forward to spending 
even more time together, discovering new places together, having fun and working out!  
 
My in-laws, brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces with a Peerbooms affiliation have 
always been with me at important moments like this. Although the group is not complete 
today, they still make a great fan group. 
I am thinking of my family, represented today by some key members, but all of them present 
in my thoughts. Ovidiu and Ligia, thank you for being here. We share a passion for mastering 
words, excellent coffee, Transylvanian landscapes and castles! One can never have enough 
of them! 
Andrei, my very dear brother and earliest follower, whom I used to bore with my stories, 
outbreak control is so much more exciting than animal surgery… Just joking, I value and 
admire your passion and dedication, and your charisma, you are much better on TV than I 
am. I am only sorry that Monica, my sister-in-law could not be present, she would have 
made the team complete. 
I am indebted to my wonderful mother, who is here today, and who has stood behind me at 
every step in my life, showing me by her own example that being a woman and having an 
academic career are by no means mutually exclusive, but actually very compatible. A 
thought of remembrance for my father, a most gifted professor, but most of all, a beloved 
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person, in whose shadow I stand humbly today. He would have enjoyed this day! Please 
allow me to say these words in Romanian as well. Mamei mele minunate îi sunt 
recunoscatoare pentru suportul acordat in fiecare pas din viata si pentru exemplul său de 
feminitate combinata cu profesionalism universitar. Un gand pios de aducere aminte tatalui 
meu, un profesor exceptional si in primul rand, un om iubit, in a carui umbra cu emotie 
pasesc azi. Ar fi fost fericit sa fie aici. 
 
Ebo & Bo, with you around, life is full of energy and joy. You make me very proud. Paul, my 
‘global expansion’ started with you; now, 27 years later, I still think that we both made the 
right choice.  
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